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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 930176-CA 
GARY D. HILFIKER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for murder and aggravated 
arson, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-5-203 (Supp. 1992) and 76-6-103 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the police have probable cause to arrest defendant at 
the time they gave him a Miranda warning and questioned him about 
events occurring on April 24, 1992? 
"The determination of whether probable cause exists 'depends 
upon an examination of all the information available to the 
searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at 
the time the [arrest] was made.'" State v. Chapman. 841 P.2d 725, 
728 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986)). The trial court's findings as to the facts and 
circumstances relating to probable cause will not be overturned on 
appeal "unless it clearly appears that [the trial court] was in 
error." State v. Rocha. 600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979). Accord 
State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d at 728, 
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that defendant 
waived his right to counsel, previously invoked under Miranda, and 
that defendant's confession, therefore, was admissible and that his 
motion to suppress should be denied? 
An appellate court "will reverse the trial court's finding of 
a valid waiver [of Miranda rights] only if that finding is clearly 
in error or the court has abused its discretion." State v. 
Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 77-7-2 of Utah Code Annotated, governing arrest by 
police officers, provides in pertinent part: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
• • • 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has 
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that 
the person arrested has committed it[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(2) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count each of 
murder and aggravated arson, both first degree felonies (R. 6-8) . 
Defendant filed two motions to suppress, one for "statements and 
all evidence secured through unlawful arrest" and the other for 
"defendant's statement to police" (R. 43-46). The trial court held 
an evidentiary hearing on the motions and thereafter denied both of 
them (R. 280-87 or addendum a). 
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Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted as charged. The 
court then entered judgment and sentenced defendant to two 
consecutive terms of five years to life in the Utah State Prison 
(R. 146-47). 
Defendant subsequently filed this timely appeal, which the 
Utah Supreme Court poured over to this Court (R. 152 or addendum 
b). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following chronology focuses on facts relevant to the 
resolution of this appeal. The times indicated reflect the 
witnesses' best estimations of when particular events occurred on 
April 24, 1992. 
3:30 am Fire fighters respond to a call of a house fire at 
434 Bryan Avenue in Salt Lake City and find the 
home "pretty much fully involved in the fire" (R. 
498-99) . 
4:00 am Jody Whitaker, a Salt Lake City police officer, 
arrives on the scene (R. 168). A neighbor 
immediately directs him to defendant, who is "quite 
excited and screaming something about some -- the 
possibility of somebody being inside of the house" 
(R. 169) . Another officer is trying to prevent 
defendant from entering the home. Whitaker sees a 
cut on defendant's right hand that is "bleeding 
pretty badly" and so takes him to an awaiting 
ambulance (R. 169). 
4:55 am Following the ambulance that is transporting 
defendant, Whitaker arrives at Holy Cross Hospital 
(R. 177). Whitaker goes to the hospital "[b]ecause 
of the fact that [defendant] was so excited, I 
didn't want him to -- in case there was somebody 
inside the house, I didn't -- basically just to let 
him know that everybody will be okay. I was there 
for moral support" (R. 171). At the hospital, 
Whitaker asks defendant what happened, and 
defendant says he broke a window by slapping it 
with his open hand (R. 172) . Jeff Long, a fire 
investigator for Salt Lake City, also goes to the 
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hospital and is told by defendant that he does not 
know how the fire started (R. 775, 778). 
5:00 am Robin Howell, a Salt Lake City police officer and 
the detective in charge of this case, responds to a 
call of a fire fatality at the Bryan Avenue home 
(R. 189-90, 190-91) . For just over an hour, he 
tours the site, gathering information from other 
police and fire officers. He discovers or is shown 
two similar jackets with blood on them, blood on 
three vehicles and on the house, a kitchen knife 
with blood on it, the body of a woman in the front 
room of the home, and a burn pattern near the 
victim that may be caused by a fire accelerant. He 
also learns that defendant lived in the home and 
discovered the fire, and that defendant had been 
taken to the hospital for treatment of a cut on his 
hand (R. 190-94) . 
5:58 am As he is driving defendant back home to Bryan 
Avenue from the hospital, Jody Whitaker receives a 
radio request from Robin Howell to transport 
defendant to the public safety building (R. 173, 
195) . Both Whitaker and Howell testify that this 
is "standard action" when investigating witnesses 
to a crime (R. 173-74, 196). Defendant becomes 
"quite excited" at the request, indicating to 
Whitaker "that he was positive that they found her 
inside dead, and they'd think he did it" (R. 174). 
Defendant says he is tired, wants to go home and 
sleep, but agrees to talk to somebody at public 
safety (R. 174-75). 
6:10 am Whitaker and defendant arrive at the public safety 
building and go to the sixth floor, where they meet 
Robin Howell. Whitaker sits in an office with 
defendant and begins writing up his report, while 
Howell does "some running around" (R. 175, 183). 
Whitaker stays with defendant until his shift is 
over, just after 8 am (R. 177). 
6:30 am Howell asks Whitaker and defendant to move to an 
interview room (R. 184). In a ten-minute 
conversation, Howell obtains written permission 
from defendant, who had been living at the Bryan 
Avenue home, to search the premises (R. 196) . 
Howell then leaves the room to radio the officers 
at the scene to proceed with a search (R. 197). 
6:50 am Based on what he has seen and heard at Bryan 
Avenue, Howell is suspicious both that the death of 
Marsha Haverty may be a homicide and that defendant 
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may be involved (R. 198-200). Howell, therefore, 
enumerates defendant's Miranda rights to him prior 
to interviewing him (R. 197-98, 205, 214-15).* 
Howell then questions defendant, who makes no 
inculpatory statements, but who also fails to 
dispel Howell's suspicions about defendant's lack 
of alibi from 1:30-3:30 am and the absence of any 
singeing of defendant's hair, which Howell believes 
would have occurred if defendant had entered the 
burning home as he contended (R. 220-21). 
7:15 am Howell turns the interview over to James Alcock, 
another police detective, so that he can return to 
Bryan Avenue, where he is in charge of the 
investigation. Howell fills Alcock in on what he 
knows and gives him further direction for the 
interview (R. 223-24). 
7:43 am Alcock begins interviewing defendant in order to 
clarify "some discrepancies in the statement, 
vagueness of times, places, names, such things as 
that" (R. 253). 
9:00 am When Alcock turns the tape over in his recorder, he 
reaffirms defendant's Miranda rights. Defendant 
agrees to continue talking to him (R. 236-37, 258-
59). 
Pursuant to Howell's directions, Alcock discusses 
with defendant arrangements for taking his blood-
stained clothing and obtaining replacement 
clothing, perhaps from the evidence room. 
Defendant agrees to the exchange (R. 238). 
9:14 am Alcock requests permission from defendant for a 
blood draw and advises defendant that he need not 
agree to the request. At this point, defendant 
asks for an attorney, and the interview is 
terminated (R. 306). Alcock leaves the room to 
telephone Howell about defendant's request for 
counsel. David Timmerman, another detective who 
had entered the room a few minutes earlier, 
clarifies to defendant that his request for an 
attorney has triggered the termination of the 
interview (R. 238-40, 265-67). 
9:15 am Because defendant states that he is hungry, Alcock 
takes him to the first floor cafeteria, where 
1
 The State conceded at the suppression hearing that, at this 
point, defendant was in custody (R. 316-17). 
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defendant purchases breakfast and some aspirin. 
During the 45-60 minutes defendant and Alcock are 
in the cafeteria, they talk about mutual 
acquaintances in the taxi cab industry (R. 240-42, 
275) . 
9:33 am Having been informed of defendant's request for 
counsel, Robin Howell stops the consent search of 
the Bryan Avenue home and returns to the public 
safety building to prepare a probable cause 
statement for a search warrant (R. 227). 
10:00 am Alcock and defendant return from the cafeteria to a 
sixth floor interview room, where Alcock leaves 
defendant for a few minutes. During this time, the 
evidence room notifies Alcock that clothing long 
enough to fit defendant has been found. Alcock 
returns to the interview room, intending to tell 
defendant about the clothing.2 At this point, 
defendant says either, flI want to tell you what 
really happened last night. I can't live with this 
anymore" or "I need to talk to you11 (R. 242-44, 
723) .3 
2
 Appellant's brief intimates some conflict in Detective 
Alcock's testimony on this point (Br. of App. at 7, 12). At the 
suppression hearing, Alcock testified, "I do not recall saying 
anything; however, I may have said, 'Hey, Gary,' in order to just 
basically get his attention" (R. 244). At trial, Alcock testified, 
"I opened the door to the interview room and stepped in to say, 
'Gary, you know, we've located some clothing. I am going to go 
down and get it. I will be right back'" (R. 723). If Alcock's 
phrase at trial, "stepped in to say" is interpreted as "stepped in 
with the intention of saying," then no significant conflict exists 
between the detective's statements at the suppression hearing and 
at trial. Under either interpretation, Alcock did not initiate any 
conversation that could reasonably be regarded as interrogation of 
defendant. 
3
 Once again, appellant's brief seems to imply that Alcock's 
testimony is in conflict (Br. of App at 12-13) . A close reading of 
both statements in context, however, reveals no significant 
inconsistency. Alcock reported defendant's longer, more detailed 
statement at the suppression hearing, where he specifically 
reported, in response to counsel's individual questions, what each 
party said when Alcock reentered the interview room. (R. 244) . The 
more general statement, which appellant refers to as "less 
forceful," came in at trial, where Alcock made a longer narrative 
response to a more general question about how the conversation 
began (R. 722-23) . Both statements are consistent in indicating 
that defendant initiated the substantive conversation, the matter 
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10:15 am After leaving the room to get a tape recorder and 
tapes, and telling Howell that defendant wants to 
make a statement, Alcock returns to the interview 
room (R. 244-45), He reaffirms defendant's Miranda 
rights, specifically reminding him of his right to 
an attorney (R. 248-49). Defendant then admits to 
stabbing Marsha Haverty and setting the house on 
fire to cover up what he had done (See State's 
exhibit #37 for complete transcript). 
11:16 am The interview stops. Jeff Long, the fire 
department arson investigator, enters and asks to 
talk with defendant (R. 276). 
11:20 am Jeff Long resumes the interview (R. 276-77). 
11:23 am The interview ends (R. 276). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the police conducted the custodial questioning of 
defendant, they had probable cause to arrest him and had properly 
given him a Miranda warning. Robin Howell, the detective in 
charge, had gleaned a variety of facts from police and fire 
officers at the scene. Based on this constellation of facts, he 
reasonably believed that a crime had been committed and that 
defendant committed it. The trial court so found, and defendant 
has wholly failed to demonstrate how the undisputed facts led to a 
clearly erroneous ruling. Because the fourth amendment was not 
violated, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
After defendant had invoked his right to counsel pursuant to 
Miranda, all interrogation by the police immediately ceased. An 
hour later, defendant initiated a conversation with the police that 
ultimately led to his confession. Prior to implicating himself, 
of legal relevance here. 
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defendant repeatedly acknowledged that he understood his rights 
under Miranda. His subsequent course of action, giving the police 
a detailed and incriminating account of murder and arson, in 
conjunction with his testimony at the suppression hearing, 
demonstrates that he waived his right to counsel knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in so deciding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHEN THE POLICE CONDUCTED THE CUSTODIAL 
QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, THEY HAD PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST HIM, AND THEY HAD PROPERLY 
GIVEN HIM A MIRANDA WARNING. THEREFORE, THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT WAS NOT VIOLATED AND THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS. 
Defendant argues that, because the police officers detained 
and questioned him without probable cause for an arrest, and 
because defendant made incriminating statements without the benefit 
of any intervening event to attenuate his confession from the 
allegedly illegal arrest, all statements following the initial 
detention must be suppressed (Br. of App. at 8). The attenuation 
prong of defendant's argument need not be addressed unless the 
trial court clearly erred in its determination that the police had 
probable cause to arrest defendant. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a police officer 
must have probable cause to detain an individual for custodial 
questioning. Dunawav v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) . 
Plainly, to hold an individual and question him without such 
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probable cause will violate the fourth amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable seizures. 
The "ultimate inquiry" for determining whether an individual 
is "in custody" for fourth amendment purposes is "simply whether 
there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of 
the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. 
Beheler. 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 
(1983) (per curiam). This is an objective test, one measured by 
"how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have 
understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 
104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). 
Defendant argues at length that he was in custody beginning at 
about 6:00 am -- "from the moment he left the hospital enroute 
[sic] to the police station, if not sooner" (Br. of App. at 22). 
Notably, the State conceded at the suppression hearing that 
defendant was in custody at 6:50 am, when Detective Howell gave 
defendant his Miranda warning (R. 316). The prosecution stated, "I 
don't think we can get around that. Although Detective Howell 
wasn't sure that he would let him go, the -- we are acquiescing in 
custody and detention occurring at that point" (R. 316-317). 
Furthermore, the trial court, in ruling on the suppression motion, 
stated: 
Defendant was given the Miranda warning as the 
interview started in the Homicide Section 
about 6:50 am. Officer Howell advised 
Defendant he didn't want to let him go until 
he got more information. He advised Defendant 
he was detaining him. 
(R. 283). 
It is unclear to what end defendant's lengthy custody argument 
on appeal is directed. Defendant gains nothing by asserting that 
he was in custody at 6:00 am rather than 6:50 am. In that interim, 
defendant only gave his consent to search the premises at Bryan 
Avenue. He made no inculpatory statements. 
The pivotal question thus becomes whether, at 6:50 am when 
Detective Howell formally recognized the detention by enumerating 
defendant's Miranda rights to him, the officer had probable cause 
to believe that a crime had been committed and that defendant had 
committed it. 
The determination of whether probable cause exists depends 
upon an examination of all the circumstances confronting the 
officer at the time. See State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986) ; see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 
69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949). It is an objective determination, made 
from the standpoint of a "prudent, reasonable, cautious police 
officer . . . guided by his experience and training." United 
States v. Davis, 458 P.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir. 1972) . Probable cause 
does not rely on certainties. Instead, as the name implies, it 
calls for "a rationally based conclusion of probability." State v. 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. And, police officers can make an arrest 
based on probable cause without a warrant if "from the facts known 
to the officer, and the inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position would be 
justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." 
State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah App. (1991) (quoting 
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State v. Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972)). See also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-2(2) (1990) (governing arrest by police officers). 
In this case, when Detective Howell mirandized defendant at 
6:50 am, he had the following facts before him. He knew that 
defendant had lived in the Bryan Avenue home, that there were no 
signs of forced entry into the home, that a woman had died in the 
fire, that defendant discovered the fire, and that the burn pattern 
near the victim's body suggested use of a fire accelerant. 
Detective Howell saw that defendant's clothes were blood-stained, 
and he also knew that blood had been found near the home on two 
similar jackets, at least one of which belonged to defendant; on 
three vehicles, one of which was rented by defendant; on a knife; 
and on the home itself. He also knew that defendant had been taken 
to the hospital for treatment of a cut on his hand (R. 191-94, 686-
87, 704-05, 707). 
Based upon this constellation of facts, all known to Detective 
Robin Howell at the time he gave defendant his Miranda rights, the 
trial court concluded that the officer had probable cause to seize 
defendant (R. 281-82, 287). Defendant does not dispute these 
facts, but instead focuses his analysis on Jody Whitaker, the 
patrol officer who first arrived on the scene and who later 
accompanied defendant to the hospital (Br. of App. at 25) . Officer 
Whitaker was a patrol officer who happened to be in the 
neighborhood and who filled in where he was needed. He helped 
defendant obtain needed medical attention, accompanied him to the 
hospital, and offered to drive him home afterwards. His role was 
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essentially one of moral support (R. 168-71). Because he was not 
the investigator assigned to oversee the case, he was not privy to 
much of the information Robin Howell had and was not in any 
position to make the probable cause decision. To focus on Jody 
Whitaker in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest 
defendant is to miss the mark entirely. The focus should properly 
be on Robin Howell, the officer in charge, who had the facts before 
him and who actually made the probable cause determination. 
As to Howell, defendant states only, "The lack of probable 
cause to arrest Gary is emphasized by Detective Howell's decision 
not to mirandize Gary during the initial interview at the police 
station, the delay until 9:30 a.m. in discussing a formal arrest, 
and the failure to place Gary under arrest until after his 
confession" (Br. of App. at 26) . When the formal arrest occurred, 
however, is not at issue. The issue is whether, at 6:50 am, Howell 
had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and 
that defendant committed it.4 
Because defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate that the 
undisputed facts found by the trial court led to a clearly 
erroneous ruling, the trial court's probable cause determination 
should be upheld. Accordingly, this Court need not reach 
defendant's attenuation argument. 
4
 Similarly misplaced is defendant's focus on alternative 
explanations for the blood found on his shoes, shirt, and pants 
(Br. of App. at 25) . An alternative explanation is usually 
available in situations in which a crime has been committed and is 
not dispositive of the question of whether the facts known to 
Howell, along with their reasonable inferences, justified his 
belief that defendant committed the crime. 
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POINT TWO 
THE STATEMENTS DEFENDANT MADE AFTER HE INVOKED 
HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA WERE 
ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE DEFENDANT INITIATED THE 
CONVERSATION, HE KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND HE MADE THE 
STATEMENTS VOLUNTARILY. 
The United States Supreme Court mandated in Miranda v. Arizona 
that, prior to the custodial questioning of an individual by the 
police, "the person must be warned that he has a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney. . . . " Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) . The purpose of this warning is to 
protect the individual's constitutional rights, ensured by the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments, against compelled self-
incrimination. In the same opinion, the Court outlined procedures 
that must be followed once the warning is properly given. For 
example, " [i]f the accused indicates that he wishes to remain 
silent, 'the interrogation must cease.' If he requests counsel, 
'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.'" 
Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 
L.Ed. 378 (1981) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 
S.Ct. at 1627). 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have addressed the conditions necessary to waive Miranda 
rights that have been properly invoked. Statements made after an 
individual has invoked his right to counsel but before counsel is 
made available to him are admissible only if three conditions are 
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met: 
First, it must be the accused, not the law 
enforcement officers, who initiates the 
conversations in which the incriminating 
statements are made. Second, the prosecution 
must show, on the motion to suppress, a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel. Third, the accused's statements must 
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to 
have been voluntarily made. 
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). Accord Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) 
(plurality opinion); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 
1880, 68 L.Ed. 378 (1981); State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295 (Utah 
1984). The totality of the circumstances must be examined in 
determining whether a suspect has made a valid waiver of Miranda 
rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 483, 191 S.Ct. at 1884 
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.2d 
1461 (1938). Notably, the waiver need not be express, but "may be 
inferred from [defendant's] acknowledgement of his understanding of 
his rights and his subsequent course of action." State v. 
Heaelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). 
Applying this test to the instant facts, defendant must first 
initiate the conversation that elicits the incriminating 
statements. State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. Defendant argues 
that the incriminating conversation was simply an extension of 
ongoing events, that continuing to detain defendant after he 
requested counsel constituted an ongoing, indirect interrogation. 
Because the interrogation was continuous, defendant could not 
14 
"initiate" the later conversation in which he incriminated himself 
(Br. of App. at 13-14) . Defendant implies that to "initiate" a 
conversation within the meaning of Moore. a defendant first must be 
released from police custody or booked into jail and then, at some 
later time, independently reestablish contact with the police. 
Such a position, in essence, creates a requirement that the 
defendant be removed from the immediate presence of the police as 
soon as the right to counsel is invoked. This proposition rests on 
no discernible legal precedent. 
Analytically, defendant's status in police custody is 
unrelated to his request for counsel. Plainly, defendant was in 
custody before, during, and after his request for counsel. What is 
relevant here is whether the incriminating statements made by 
defendant after he invoked his right to counsel were the result of 
any governmental interrogation or its functional equivalent. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
[T]he term "interrogation under Miranda refers 
not only to express questioning, but also to 
any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest 
and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect. 
Rhode Island v. Innis. 466 U.S. 291, 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 
64 L.Ed. 2nd 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted). Whether a police 
statement or comment is likely to evoke an incriminating response 
must be resolved from the perspective of the defendant, but "in 
light of the officers' knowledge of the suspects characteristics." 
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Utah App. 1991) 
15 
It is undisputed that as soon as defendant requested counsel, 
the police interrogation about the fire and the homicide came to an 
immediate end (R. 239, 284, 302, 305-06). Detective Timmerman 
explicitly clarified to defendant that the interview was 
terminating because he had requested counsel (R. 239, 262). 
Between that time and the moment defendant stated that he 
wanted to talk, no express interrogation and nothing that could 
reasonably be construed as its functional equivalent occurred. At 
breakfast in the public safety building cafeteria, Detective Alcock 
and defendant conversed about mutual acquaintances in the taxi cab 
business (R. 240-42, 275) . The only conversation even remotely 
relating to the events at Bryan Avenue concerned defendant's 
purchase of aspirin for pain from his cut hand (R. 302, 306-07). 
The breakfast conversation was not a continuation of interrogation 
within the meaning of Miranda and its progeny; nor should Miranda 
be so narrowly construed as to eliminate all manner of conversation 
between an individual in custody and a police officer. 
When the two men returned to the sixth floor after breakfast, 
Detective Alcock left defendant in an interview room for a few 
moments and then returned to the room, intending to tell defendant 
that some replacement clothing had been found for him. Alcock's 
words, if indeed they were actually spoken, were plainly not 
"interrogation" within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis; they 
were not designed to elicit or likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from defendant. See State v. Singer. 815 P.2d at 1311 
(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis. 466 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1688-
16 
89). Rather, their purpose was to get defendant's attention and 
provide him with information. 
Defendant's words to Alcock, reported either as "I want to 
tell you what really happened last night. I can't live with this 
anymore," or "I need to talk to you," constituted the initiation of 
conversation required by Moore (R. 244, 308, 723). Defendant's 
words marked the first time since he had requested counsel that any 
substantive reference to the events of the previous evening had 
been made. With no prompting by Detective Alcock, defendant's 
words clearly communicated "a desire . . . to open up a more 
generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the 
investigation." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. 
The second condition necessary for admissibility of an 
incriminating statement made after the right to counsel has been 
invoked but prior to counsel being made available is that the 
prosecution show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel. State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. This determination 
"depends 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding 
the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the 
accused.'" Id. (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. 
Defendant's argument on this point is that, since defendant 
had been up all night and was obviously tired, and since he had 
been in the company of police officers from shortly after the fire 
was discovered until he made his incriminating statement, he did 
not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel (Br. of 
App. at 14). 
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In this case, defendant knew full well what he was doing when 
he waived his right to counsel and made his incriminating 
statement. At the suppression hearing, he testified about the 
content of the Miranda warning, explaining that it allowed him to 
remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and 
that he had the right to a lawyer, regardless of his ability to pay 
(R. 301) . He knew that when he invoked his right to counsel, that 
request caused all questioning about the events at Bryan Avenue to 
immediately cease (R. 302, 305-06). Despite his frustration and 
exhaustion, he knew that when he told Alcock he wanted to talk 
about what happened, he still had the right to an attorney (R. 
309). He reiterated this several times (R. 309-11). 
Immediately prior to making his confession, defendant was once 
again reminded of his Miranda rights. The following interchange 
with Detective Alcock occurred at the outset of the conversation in 
which defendant spelled out the details of what he had done: 
Q: Now there's several things that I need 
to advise you of again, before we proceed. 
Number 1 [sic] is you know, we have advised 
you of your rights as per Miranda. 
A: Right. 
Q: And at the outset, you agreed to talk 
with us. 
A: Right. 
Q: Then we got down to the tail end there 
where we asked if we could draw blood, at 
which time you said you wished to talk to an 
attorney. Now, what I want to make it clear 
here [sic], is that you're still under 
Miranda, you have requested an attorney, so we 
have reached a point where you voluntarily. . 
A: By my choice. 
Q: Of your own free will and accord, if you 
wish to make a statement, we'll listen to it, 
ok. I want you to understand that you still 
have that right to an attorney. If you wish 
to, voluntarily, you are not being coerced. 
A: Yes, I do wish. Can't live with myself. 
(State's Exhibit #37 or addendum c) . This conversation, while 
explicitly designed to establish the voluntary element of the 
confession, implicitly demonstrates defendant's understanding of 
what he was about to do. Even as he was about to confess, 
defendant was aware that he had a right to an attorney and that he 
need not proceed with any incriminating statement. His subsequent 
conduct, then, weighs heavily in favor of waiver. See State v. 
Heaelman. 717 P.2d at 1349. 
Finally, to meet the third condition for admissibility, 
defendant's statement must be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence to have been voluntarily made. State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 
at 236. The crux of defendant's argument on this point is that, 
because defendant was exhausted and suffering from a serious cut on 
his hand, and because he had been in police company for up to six 
hours and his request for counsel had not been immediately met, his 
confession was essentially coerced (Br. of App. at 14-15). 
At the suppression hearing, defendant testified at length on 
this point, stating that he knew he still had the right to an 
attorney, but "At that point, I was -- I mean, I was tired, 
exhausted, frustrated. • . • I felt like -- like -- I mean, I was 
going to be stuck in this room until something was said" (R. 309) . 
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Later, he added, "As frustrated as I was — I mean, I was sick of 
sitting there" (R. 310). 
The undisputed facts reflect that defendant invoked his right 
to counsel at 9:14 am, that the questioning immediately ceased, 
that Detective Alcock then accompanied defendant to the cafeteria 
for 45-60 minutes and that, at 10:15 am, shortly upon returning to 
an interview room, defendant expressed a desire to talk. An hour 
at most passed between the time defendant requested counsel and the 
time he decided to confess. The frustration expressed by defendant 
at the suppression hearing might well reflect his feelings at the 
time, but the source of those feelings cannot reasonably be 
attributed to "some physical or psychological force or manipulation 
that is designed to induce the accused to talk when he would not 
otherwise have done so." State v. Moore. 697 P.2d at 237 (emphasis 
added). There is simply no record evidence to suggest any 
intentional conduct on the part of the police either to deny 
defendant his right to counsel or to unnecessarily detain him. 
Indeed, anyone who is detained by the police may well 
experience frustration, anxiety, or other intense psychological 
distress: 
'Any interview of one suspected of a crime by 
a police officer will have coercive aspects to 
it, simply by virtue of the fact that the 
police officer is part of a law enforcement 
system which may ultimately cause the suspect 
to be charged with a crime.' 
State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355, 357 (1980) (quoting Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)). 
Nonetheless, "a confession is not involuntary because an accused 
20 
experiences some anxiety because of his arrest and incarceration." 
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. Such, indeed, was the case here. 
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's findings that 
defendant's statements "were voluntary and not coerced" (R. 287). 
Because the trial court's determination that defendant had 
waived his Miranda rights was not "clearly in error" and because 
defendant has failed to show that the court abused its discretion, 
the determination should be upheld. See State v. Hecrelman. 717 
P.2d at 1349 (citing State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980)) . 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for murder and aggravated arson. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2 _ daY o f August, 1993. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: At about 4:00 a.m. on April 
24th, 1992f a fire occurred at 434 Bryan Avenue. 
Defendant, a resident of said address, was present, 
and was discovered by the fire personnel as well as 
the police officers. And around 4:30 a.m. on that 
date, the police rendered first aid to the Defendant, 
Gary D. Hilfiker. 
Following the rendition of first aid, 
the Defendant was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for 
treatment of a badly or severely lacerated right 
hand • 
When the medical treatment at Holy Cross 
was completed and Officer Whitaker started to return 
the Defendant back to his home at 434 Bryan Avenue, 
Officer Singer (sic) contacted Whitaker by phone and 
directed him to transport the Defendant to the Public 
Safety Building. That occurred some time around 6:00 
a.m. on April the 24th, 1992. And the Defendant and 
Officer Whitaker arrived at the Public Safety Building 
sometime shortly after 6:00 a.m., 6:20 a.m., on that 
morning. 
When Officer Whitaker indicated they 
were going to the Public Safety Building, the 
Defendant was initially excited, and indicated that 
2 
nnno£fi 
1 they had found the body and that they thought he did 
2 it. Officer Whitaker, himself, didnft consider 
3 Defendant under arrest, asked Defendant to answer some 
41 questions and the Defendant said he was willing to 
5 talk with someone. 
61 When they arrived at the Public Safety 
71 Building, Officer Whitaker subsequently turned the 
81 Defendant over to Officer Howell sometime after 6:00 
91 a.m. 
10 Detective Howell, who was with the 
111 Homicide Unit, was the assigned detective in charge of 
121 the -- first of the fire, and then of the homicide. 
131 Around 6:30 a.m., Officer Howell took 
141 Defendant into an interview room there in the Arson 
151 Division, and interviewed the Defendant for 
161 approximately 10 to 15 minutes. 
17 MR. BOWN: I believe that was the 
181 Robbery Division. 
19 THE COURT: The Robbery Division, I 
201 stand corrected. Thank you. 
211 The subject matter of that interview 
22 generally related to the searching of the house and 
23 the vehicles and the property located at 434 Bryan 
241 Avenue. 
25 At that point, the officers had found 
3 
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the body of Marsha Haverty. They had found a knife 
with blood on it out in the yard. They had found 
blood on three cars. They had found an accelerant 
burn pattern in the building. They had observed a 
jacket inside of the cab with blood on it: a white 
jacket behind the house with blood on it. And the 
jackets appeared to have a common logo on them. 
They had found that there was no forced 
entry into the house. They had found that the 
Defendant had blood on his shoes, pants and shirt. 
They had questioned Defendant, who they 
knew to be a resident at that address, briefly about 
how the fire had started. And during that interview, 
there was not an adequate explanation of his 
whereabouts for the prior two hours. 
Officer Howell asked Defendant for 
permission to search the home and the vehicle, and 
Defendant gave his consent for the search. To that 
point, there had had been no Miranda Warning, and 
nothing incriminatory had been said. 
Officer Howell then went about preparing 
the consent document. 
At that point. Defendant was moved to an 
interview room in the Homicide Division there on the 
sixth floor of the Public Safety Building. 
4 
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Defendant was given the Miranda Warning 
as the interview started in the Homicide Section about 
6:50 a.m. 
Officer Howell advised Defendant he 
didn't want to let him go until he got more 
information. He advised Defendant he was detaining 
him. 
Officer Howell continued the 
interrogation until about 7:15 a.m., even though 
Defendant had indicated he was tired and wanted to get 
some sleep. 
No incriminatory statements had been 
made. 
Defendant had not been placed under 
formal arrest. 
Sometime near that time, Officer Howell 
turned the Defendant over to Officer Whitaker (sic), 
who was in the interrogation room. Officer Howell 
gave instructions to Officer Alcock to continue the 
interrogation. Officer Alcock continued the 
interrogation. 
At about 9:00 a.m., the first side of 
the tape was full, the tape was turned over and 
Officer Alcock reminded the Defendant again of his 




A request was made to draw blood from 
the Defendant. At that time, Defendant said: "I want 
a lawyer now," 
A few more clarifying questions were 
asked by Officer Alcock, he terminated the 
interrogation and asked no more questions about either 
the fire or the homicide. 
Defendant made a comment to Alcock that 
he was hungry, so he and the Defendant went to 
breakfast in the Public Safety Building Cafeteria 
downstairs. 
No questions were asked about the fire 
or the homicide. 
After breakfast, the Defendant and 
Alcock returned to the interview room. 
During the second interview, there had 
been discussions about taking Defendant's clothing 
because of the bloodstains, thereon, and there had 
been discussions about getting a change of clothes. 
Evidence had called about that time, and advised that 
they had located a change of clothing for the 
Defendant so that Defendant's clothing could be 
examined • 
Officer Alcock was briefly out of the 
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interrogation room, he returned and advised the 
Defendant that the clothing were available and that 
arrangements could be made to change out of the soiled 
clothing. 
At that point, the Defendant indicated 
to Officer Alcock that he wanted to tell him 
something• 
Alcock, at that point, left the room to 
secure a tape recorder* He returned with a tape 
recorder, and reminded the Defendant that the officers 
had advised him of his rights, which the Defendant 
acknowledged• 
Officer Alcock then reminded Defendant 
that he still had the right to an attorney. 
Defendant, following that admonition, 
indicated that it was his wish to go ahead. 
Thereafter, the Defendant made his 
confession. 
The Defendant, following the medical 
treatment, went to the Public Safety Building 
willingly and voluntarily. Well before he gave any 
incriminatory information, he was advised of -- given 
the Miranda Warnings. 
He voluntarily gave his consent to the 
search of his premises and vehicles. 
7 
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He was again reminded of his rights at 
the end of the first tape. 
When Officer Zimmerman (sic) sought to 
draw a blood sample and Defendant asked for a lawyer, 
the interrogation was stopped. 
Officer Alcock, thereafter, took 
Defendant to breakfast. Nothing was discussed 
relating to the homicide or the arson during 
breakfast; although, there was a brief discussion 
about Defendant's injured hand, and the aspirins were 
secured for the hand. 
When they returned to the interrogation 
room and Officer Alcock advised the Defendant that the 
clothing had been secured and were ready, the 
Defendant, without any provocation from Officer 
Alcock, advised the Defendant (sic) that he wanted to 
tell him something. 
At that point, Officer Alcock again 
reminded him of his Miranda Rights, which the 
Defendant acknowledged he understood. 
Officer Alcock, again, reminded him of 
his right to an attorney. And notwithstanding the 
second admonition, Defendant advised Officer Alcock 
that he wished to continue. 
The Court finds and concludes the 
8 
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ll statements, thereafter, were voluntary and not 
2 coerced. 
31 At the time the Defendant was asked to 
41 consent to the search of his home and vehicles, the 
51 officers had probable cause to secure a search 
6 warrant. Defendant voluntarily gave his permission 
7 for the searches. 
81 Accordingly, the Court concludes, after 
9 considering the totality of the circumstances, that 
10 Defendant's motion to suppress the confession taken at 
11 the Public Safety Building should be denied, and that 
12 the seizure of the Defendant was done with probable 
13 cause and was not illegal* 
141 Both motions to suppress are denied. 
151 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, in anticipation 
16 of the future, I note some of these cases indicate 
171 that they will review probable cause themselves, and 
18 then they will send it back for an attenuation 
19 hearing. Would the Court consider making findings 
201 about attenuation if, in fact, there was no probable 
21! cause so that that hearing wouldn't have to occur? 
22 THE COURT: Well, I don't recall that I 
231 have the part of the transcript that identified -- you 
24 only gave me one page. I don't know the specific time 
25 in which the tape was put on on the last interview. 
9 
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1| Does it have the time? 
21 MR. BOWN: I believe Officer Alcock 
31 indicated that by his watch -- although it was not on 
4 the tape, he said 12:15 is when it started. 
5 MS. JOHNSON: 10:15. 
6| MR. BOWN: Excuse me, 10:15. 
71 THE COURT: And the Court would 
8 specifically find that the request for a lawyer was 
9 9:14, 9:15. And that during that intervening period 
10 of time, they went down to the cafeteria on the first 
11 floor of the Public Safety Building and obtained 
12 breakfast. And it wasn't until they arrived back at 
13 the sixth floor of the Homicide Division, which was in 
14 the range of 10:15, that there was any conversation at 
151 all that related to anything pertaining to the case, 
16 other than the brief conversation in the cafeteria 
17 about the injured hand. 
18 And when they arrived back, Officer 
191 Alcock was out of the room for a few minutes, came 
20 back and he indicated to the Defendant that the 
211 clothes were available and ready. And it was at that 
221 point that the Defendant said he had something he 
231 wanted to tell him. 
241 The officer went and got a tape recorder 
251 at that point, returned to the room and reminded the 
I 10 
000288 
1 Defendant of the earlier Miranda Warnings he had 
21 received, one; and, two, he said he still had a right 
31 to an attorney, 
41 And the Court would conclude that that's 
5 sufficient attenuation? again, reminded him of those 
61 rights, and gave him the opportunity, if he wanted an 
7 attorney, and the Defendant replied that he wanted to 
81 go forward. 
9 MR. BOWN: Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: A motion was filed October 
11 20th on motion for discovery. 
12 Have you received that? Have you 
13 disposed of that? 
14 MR. BOWN: I received a couple of them. 
15 THE COURT: I've only been handed one. 
16 MR. BOWN: There was the independent 
17 testing of the two vials of blood taken from 
18 Mr. Hilfiker. And I understand that that has been 
19 provided. 
201 MS. JOHNSON: That's correct. Judge, we 
21 do have that* 
221 MR. BOWN: And the only reason I — and 
231 that was done by Mr. Ernie Jones when I was out of the 
241 office* I only wanted that to be heard so that you 
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SUBJECT: GARY HILFIKER 
Q: Let's get this down on tape Ok Gary. Now there's several 
things that I need to advise you of again, before we 




And at the outset, you agreed to talk tsr us. Q 
Right. 
Then we got down to the tail end there where we asked if we 
could draw blood, at which time you said you wished to talk 
to an attorney. Now, what I want to make it clear here, is 
that you're still under Miranda, you have requested an 
attorney, so we have reached a point where you 
voluntarily 
A: By my choice. 
Q: Of your own free will and of u„iirrre, if you wish to make a 
statement, we'll listen to it, Ok. I want you to 
understand that you still have that right to an attorney. 
If you wish to, voluntarily, you are not being coerced. 
A: Yes I do wish. ~<to£-&tC *"*"/&* 
Q: Ok. Ok, Gary, let's start from the beginning. I guess 
a I'm just going to basically let you run with it and 
tell me what there is to be told. If there are additional 
questions, I'll come back, Ok, and ask. Alright. Now 
you'll feel better when it's all said and done and I think 
you realize that. Ok, go ahead. Why don't you start 
with tdss^ you feel comfortable with starting at. 
A: I don't feel comfortable with it at all. I lost my head, I 
was stoned, I could sit here and lie to you all day long, ,^^ ,,-r-
in fact I can pass one of those test, because°*J&se&3l.MpeotM&r 
What happened was, I went home and I had some Coke that was 
still with me, and she and I got stoned about a week before 
and she said, she didn't want to get stoned^ ^Py&%&t/r/v£^7~ 
alright. I went home and I went into the house^ana 1 xoTa ~ 
her, fine, then I will split *Alc^e^^B/^ie didn't want me to 
leave, she was getting realyjj/j*e*y^  serious. Myself, I 
didn't get too serious.^ ^ She kmda held on to me. I pushed 
her away and we were in thexdining room, which is between 
the front room and the a.. \ . between the front of the 
house, where she was found and\ the back of the house. I 
